LOSS OF THE FISHING VESSEL
BLUE PEARL J163

ON MONDAY 30TH JULY
1.0 SYNOPSIS

A 6.25m open fishing vessel left its berth in La Collette St Helier at approximately 10:30 for a day’s fishing in the area of the Violet Bank south east of the island. The vessel was crewed by a single person and was engaged in potting. He began hauling and resetting 9 strings of pots starting just off of Demie des Pas lighthouse and working his way slowly eastwards. On hauling the tenth string located just NW of Taxe Rock the skipper set course at slow speed away from the rocks and began banding lobsters from the recent catch. Shortly after that the vessel grounded on a small rock SE of Taxe Rock. The vessel immediately listed on the falling tide and began to swamp. Within seconds it capsized throwing the occupant into the water. Initially he climbed on top of the upturned hull to attract attention. As the vessel sank beneath him, he swam to nearby Taxe Rock. This rock began to cover on the rising tide and after an exhausting 45 minute swim to a large cluster of rocks where he was picked up cold and suffering hypothermia, by a passing commercial RIB.

2.0 THE VESSEL

2.1 The vessel is a 6.25m Loftus Bennett called BLUE PEARL J163. It is an open fishing vessel with a forward console. It was fitted with a 100hp Yamaha outboard fitted new in December 2017. It was used mainly for potting.

2.2 Records show this vessel first entered service locally in 2013 and was bought by the present owner in September 2017. It was surveyed by the Assistant Registrar at that time. Because of its age it was not provided with a SeaFish compliant hull certificate. The earliest records for this vessel date back to 2013 but the actual build date is unknown.

2.3 The vessel was observed to be in good condition and all required safety equipment, including lifejackets, were found in good order. The vessel was issued with a Safety Equipment Certificate in September 2017. Although not mandatory the vessel carried a portable VHF radio stored in the cuddy along with the only life jacket carried.

3.0 THE CREW

3.1 The vessel was operated single handed by a skipper in his mid 20s with seven years’ experience in the fishing industry. At the time the vessel was inspected at purchase the skipper held a valid Small Craft Basic Sea Survival Course issued in March 2015. He was booked to go on a First Aid Course in September 2017 but no evidence was produced of having attended a Fire Fighting Course.

3.2 When the skipper entered the water he was not wearing a life jacket. He did attempt to swim under the upturned hull to retrieve it from the stowage locker but fumes in the air pocket prevented him from doing so. Initially he removed his oilskins to attract attention. When no vessels were seen in the vicinity, he took the decision to strip to his underwear to swim some distance to the nearest drying rocks about 800-900m away. (La Conchiere)
4.0 THE AREA OF OPERATION

FIG 1 Extract from chart BA 1138

FIG 2 Drawing of area where vessel sunk provided by skipper.
5.0 NARRATIVE

5.1 Tidal conditions:  HW 08:49 BST  LW 15:22 BST  HW 21:03 BST

5.2 The open fishing vessel **BLUE PEARL** departed its berth in La Collette basin at about 10:30 and headed east towards the Demie de Pas Lighthouse. On reaching this area the skipper began hauling and checking his strings of pots working slowly eastwards against the ebbing time. As he recovered each string he would collect the catch and bait the pot before laying the string by towing it back into place. His final string was located in way of the Bretts Channel just northwest of the Taxe rock. He reached this string at approximately 14:30 just before low water. He shot the string of pots and towed the end into position in a semi-circle taking care to keep clear of Taxe Rock.

5.3 The vessel was slowly moving SW at approximately 3 knots. The skipper was engaged in banding recently caught lobsters at the same time. Banding is the practice of placing elastic bands over the lobsters claws to prevent then injuring handlers or each other. He was located on the starboard side of the vessel at the time. Shortly after this the vessel struck and grounded on a submerged rock which he later identified as the small rock SSW of Taxe rock that dries at 2.7m. At 14:30 tide height was 2.5m and the tide would have begun to turn shortly afterwards to the east. This isolated rock would have been just on or below the surface.

5.4 The vessel struck the rock and grounded, immediately taking on a list to port. The tide tables show that low water actually occurred a 1450 where the tide had dropped a further 20cms. The list was further compounded by the weight of pots stored on that side. The vessel soon swamped and capsized. The skipper managed to scramble onto the upturned hull, standing up to attract attention by waving his oilskin. There were no other vessels visible in the area.

5.5 The skipper then swam under the hull in the hope of retrieving his safety equipment. However he soon found that the tiny air pocket in the hull was heavily contaminated with petrol fumes and had to abandon his quest. Soon after he surfaced and noted the vessel was sinking stern first due to the weight of the engine. He swam towards Taxe Rock, which was still uncovered. It dries at 3.5m tide height. The rock began to cover with the rising tide and soon became awash. Since there was no sign of any vessel in the vicinity, he decided to strip off his outer clothes and head for the next closest rocks with a view to swimming ashore.

5.6 He swam for 45 minutes and landed on some rocks about 20m from his intended target. He had become exhausted and cold and, barely able to stand up, subsequently missed flagging down the first passing boat. He was soon spotted by a commercial RIB, **INTREPID VOYAGER**, who went to rescue him.

5.7 The skipper of the RIB described the casualty as looking tired and showing initial signs of hypothermia, shaking and shivering, with slurred speech. He looked quite pale, he was almost naked when he was assisted aboard but there were no visual signs of any injuries. He was provided with dry clothes, water and had something to eat and by the time the RIB arrived back in St. Helier, Albert Pier, he was looking considerably better. He had some colour back in his cheeks, speech was reverting back to normal and the shaking and shivering was no longer present. He was met by RNLI staff who provided him with a blanket and some additional clothes. He was then taken to a waiting ambulance, which took him to Accident and Emergency. He was assessed and discharged later that evening at about 18:30.

5.8 The vessel was deemed a total constructive loss and is not likely to be salvaged as it does not represent a hazard to navigation even with its proximity to the axis of Bretts Passage.
FIG 3 Print off from the chart plotter of INTREPID VOYAGER showing the position the casualty was recovered.

6.0 FINDINGS

6.1 It can be seen from Fig 3 that the distance between the point of capsize to where the casualty was recovered is approximately 800m. The casualty embarked on this swim almost naked in sea temperature of 18°C and without a life jacket. By the time he left the Taxe Rock was becoming awash the tide was flooding and his nearest drying rock, La Conchiere (2m High) was 1000m away and up tide from him. His swim against the tide covered 800m in 45 minutes and left him exhausted and hypothermic. By his own admission he lacked the strength to complete the final 20m to La Conchiere rock, which indicated the advanced state of exhaustion he was in. The position from which he was recovered would have covered at half tide. If he hadn’t been picked up when he was it is very likely that he would have succumbed to hypothermia. Survival rates for an exhausted person in the water with a temperature of 18°C is approximately 1-2 hours.

6.2 The vessel was in good order having been inspected on transfer of ownership in September of 2017. A life jacket was provided on board for the single occupant.

6.3 The occupant was not wearing his lifejacket at the time of capsize and had little chance to retrieve it and don it before the vessel turned over and he was thrown into the water.

6.4 Although not mandatory for vessels under 7m in length the vessel carried a portable VHF radio. This was also stowed in the cuddy and inaccessible due to the sudden capsize. The occupant had no other means of communication.
Potting can be a hazardous operation on a small open boat as instant snagging can be a problem. Often this causes the vessel to take a severe list and in some cases capsize. Lives have been lost in this manner here in Jersey previously.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS:

6.1 The BLUE PEARL was appropriately equipped for the voyage being undertaken and the skipper suitably qualified and experienced.

6.2 The BLUE PEARL struck a charted rock SSW of Taxe rock at a time when the skipper, the only person aboard, was occupied with banding lobsters. The vessel quickly capsized and sank by the stern.

6.3 The skipper was wearing suitable waterproof clothing but was not wearing his lifejacket. The lifejacket was stowed in a location that was not immediately accessible. Consequently, when the skipper found himself in the water, he was faced with the need to abandon his protective clothing in order to swim. This shortened the time before he became susceptible to hypothermia and he was exhausted by the time he reached the rock from which he was rescued.

6.4 Whilst BLUE PEARL carried a portable VHF radio this was also not immediately accessible. In the absence of a Personal Locator Beacon or a vessel EPIRB it was not possible for the alarm to be raised when the fishing vessel sank.

6.5 The actions of the skipper of the commercial RIB INTREPID VOYAGER, in manoeuvring his vessel to rescue the BLUE PEARL’S skipper from the rock on which he had taken refuge, and providing appropriate first aid on passage were key in preventing the incident from having more serious consequences.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 A copy of this report should be sent to local Fishermen’s Associations.

7.2 A Safety Bulletin should be produced for all fishermen, especially those operating single handed drawing attention to lessons learned from this incident and to similar incidents investigated by the UK MAIB. This should include a recommendation on the wearing of suitable lifejackets and Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs).

7.3 Ports of Jersey should consider opening a similar consultation to that being carried out by the MCA in the UK to amend the Approved Code of Conduct to make the wearing of lifejackets and of PLBs compulsory for single-handed fishermen.

7.4 Jersey should consider adopting any regulatory or guidance changes made by the UK in a way that ensures equivalent standards of safety are maintained for local vessels.